On January 14, Armenia’s Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan signed a Strategic Partnership charter with the United States in the latest instance of Yerevan’s geopolitical pivot toward the West.  The catch? Mirzoyan signed the document with now former U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, part of an administration that ended less than a week later.  However, a recent handful of developments hint at both the potential for, but also confusion over, Yerevan’s interest in partnering with the West.

Aside from the United States, Yerevan’s second vector for Western alignment is with the European Union (EU).  January saw significant news on that front as well, with the government of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan endorsing a piece of legislation that would set into law Armenia’s intent for a European Union membership application. 

However, only a few days after Mirzoyan announced the government’s “positive stance” on the bill, Armenia’s Minister of Economy, Gevorg Papoyn, stated that Armenia was not interested in “replacing” the Moscow-backed Eurasian Economy Union (EAEU) with the EU.  Papoyn additionally stated, “The EU accession process is a parallel agenda.  Our task is not to discuss those agendas, but to increase the resilience and competitiveness of our economy.”  On January 21, in response to a question on EAEU membership conflicting with EU aspirations, Mirzoyan answered vaguely, saying the matter would be addressed at a later date.  Meanwhile, while European officials have encouraged Armenia’s EU interest, the EU itself has not added a member since 2013.

Such a multi-vector approach would undoubtedly ruffle feathers in Europe, with the EU having made clear in the case of EU aspirants Serbia and Georgia that taking more hawkish anti-Russian stances is a prerequisite for EU membership.  The case of Armenia is further complicated by the fact that since 1991, Yerevan has interwoven its economy, energy security, and defense with Russia and Russian-backed institutions.  Aside from issues relating to Russia, Armenia needs to make more progress on domestic political, social, and economic reforms as required of EU aspirants. 

Thus far, Brussels appears to have largely given Armenia a grace period in terms of these ties.  But if Yerevan is serious about EU membership, major reforms will be necessary and Papoyn’s comments raise questions as to whether there is a solid consensus in Yerevan.  Already, Armenia has worked to exit the Russian-backed Collective Security Treaty Organization and removed Russian border guards from several posts in Armenia.  But economic or energy decoupling has yet to see major progress and could have potential fallout for citizens.  In fact, like other post-Soviet countries, Armenia has seen trade with Russia boom in recent years, rising 463% between 2022 and 2023, as companies circumvent anti-Russian sanctions. 

As for relations with the United States, the recent change of administration also casts doubt over Armenia’s growing ties with Washington.  The partnership signed by Blinken and Mirzoyan stipulates a continuation of the joint Eagle Partner military exercises, as well as a visit by a team from U.S. border control services.  But, with the Trump administration eager to chart a new foreign policy course, and with a largely new team coming into the Department of State, continuity on this issue is likely to remain an open question for at least a while.

There is a certain section of President Donald Trump’s MAGA movement that has strong pro-Armenian positions.  Major figures in the Republican party, such as Vice President J.D. Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Vivek Ramaswamy, have spoken out against what they term the “persecution & displacement of Armenian Christians” from Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023.  Trump himself labeled the displacement of Armenians in 2023 as “ethnic cleansing” in a statement on social media.  However, whether any of this will make a policy impact remains to be seen, as some of the new administration’s first acts are to reverse Biden-era initiatives.  If the stipulations of the newly signed United States-Armenia partnership agreement are implemented or expanded, this could be an indicator of what the next four years will entail for Armenia-U. S. relations.

Armenia’s pivot away from Russia has produced concrete results, from millions in Western funding, to the start of visa-liberalization talks with the EU, to Armenia asserting its own sovereignty by decreasing Russia’s military presence within its borders.  Yet, recent weeks have cast doubt over what degree Armenia is able to move Westward and underscored the challenges a full split with Moscow would entail.  Further steps on energy, trade, and Armenia’s status within organizations like the EAEU will be necessary to demonstrate just how far Armenia is capable of going.