Central Asian labor migrants seeking higher wages have long found an accessible and attractive destination in Russia, drawn by a shared language and established diaspora networks. Today, however, Russia’s migration landscape is more hostile than ever. A September 10 deadline for migrants to file all residency documents threatens to displace the 670,000 people whom Russia classifies as illegal. A mass expulsion of labor migrants would not only oversaturate Central Asia’s labor market but would also exacerbate Russia’s existing labor shortage. Although reports of mass deportations have yet to appear since the deadline, Russian officials are raising the standard for legal status and building a legal framework to expedite deportations and denaturalization.  

This policy shift comes in the wake of a growing anti-immigrant sentiment triggered by the April 2024 Crocus City Hall attack, carried out by radicalized ethnic Tajiks. Russian officials amplified public anxieties by alleging a rise in crime among foreigners despite Russia’s own Ministry of Internal Affairs statistics showing a decline. Officials attributed the discrepancy to internal confusion but failed to ease public distress. Reinforcing racist stereotypes, Communist Party deputy Mikhail Matveyev claimed Central Asians are more likely to commit crimes like rape and pedophilia. This rhetoric coincides with a rise in discrimination. As recently as September 16, Russian youths mocked and beat Uzbek workers in Vladivostok, prompting Uzbek authorities to monitor the investigation. 

The Kremlin has met this social unrest with intensified constraints on migrants. To cross into Russia, migrants from visa-free countries must now submit a pre-entry application through a mobile app and present a QR code at the border. Russia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs has also introduced the “controlled persons registry,” which compiles the names of immigrants whose visas or work permits have expired or who have been convicted of a crime. Migrants added to the list are often charged with minor infractions like “petty hooliganism,” which accounts for 80 percent of the charges used to hold detained immigrants. Individuals on the list are prohibited from driving, getting married, relocating without government approval, and transferring more than 30,000 rubles a month, effectively banning migrants from sending remittances back to their home countries. Children of controlled persons are prohibited from attending schools in Russia, a rising issue as Russia imposes language tests restricting foreigners’ access to education.  

Building on these limitations, migrants in Moscow and the surrounding region are required to register on the geolocation app, Amina, as of September 1. Migrants must update their location every three days or face losing their registration and being added to the registry of controlled persons. According to personal reports, technical barriers like unreliable internet access make it difficult for law-abiding migrants to comply with these demands. The app gives police access to both users’ locations and their photo galleries, raising concerns that police will use this information to conduct raids and extort migrants.  

In line with this crackdown on migrants’ rights, deportations and denaturalization are accelerating. Russia has added more crimes punishable by deportation and given police the authority to deport foreigners without a court order, nearly doubling the number of forced deportations in 2024. Russia is also increasing denaturalization efforts, revoking the citizenship of 1,757 legal migrants in 2024.  

With weak legal protection, Central Asians are at risk of ending up on the front lines of Russia’s war with Ukraine. Reports suggest police use the threat of deportation, coercion, bribes, and even torture to force Central Asian labor migrants to sign contracts with the Russian army. As of 2024, upon receiving a Russian passport, foreigners are required to register for military service, risking deportation if they fail to do so. As a result, preliminary statistics estimate that Central Asians are the second-largest group of foreign nationals fighting for Russia. 

Despite these pressures, Russia remains the primary destination for Central Asian migrant workers. Although migration from Central Asia is decreasing and some Central Asians are leaving Russia under these conditions, Central Asians still represent the majority of immigrants to Russia. In 2024, Uzbeks made up the largest share of migrants entering the country at 23 percent, followed by Tajiks at 17 percent and Kyrgyz at 10 percent. As of 2025, Russia is still the primary destination for Central Asian labor migrants, with 63 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s 600,000 labor migrants currently in Russia.  

These workers are essential to the Central Asian economy. In 2024, remittances accounted for 48 percent of Tajikistan’s GDP, the highest in the world. Remittances also account for 14 percent of the GDP in Uzbekistan and 24 percent in Kyrgyzstan. Even though Uzbekistan has made the most effort to diversify destinations for its workers of any country in Central Asia, it is still highly reliant on Russia that supplied 77 percent of Uzbekistan’s remittances in 2024, a 29 percent increase from 2023. This heavy reliance on external labor markets makes Central Asia vulnerable to the tides of the Russian economy and migration policy.  

Russia's labor force depends on these workers, especially because of its strained wartime economy. Russian Labor Minister Anton Kotyakov told President Putin that Russia will need to add 10.9 million people to the Russian economy by 2030. This pressing need comes as Russia faces plummeting birth rates and mass emigration following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Still, Russian officials characterize labor migration as an ineffective solution to this long-term problem. Russia recently promoted a seasonal migration system with a “come, work, leave” model, discouraging Central Asians from seeking permanent residence in Russia or bringing their families with them. 

Since Russia remains a primary destination despite this discouraging crackdown, Central Asian countries are working to make migration safer, sometimes in cooperation with Russia. The head of Uzbekistan’s Migration Agency met with the head of Russia’s Federal Agency for Labor and Employment to establish training centers in Uzbekistan and provide 7,000 Uzbeks with employment in Russia. Tajikistan held a summit to improve the legal status of Tajiks in Russia and provide Russian-language education to migrants’ children. Moreover, Kazakhstan launched a new campaign to prepare Kazakhs for employment abroad. Training centers like these are essential for establishing safe migration routes, not just to Russia but to any destination. 

While these programs can make migration safer, alternative countries offer fewer hurdles than Russia’s current anti-immigrant regime. For example, in 2024, South Korea worked with Uzbekistan to attract migrants east, and Uzbeks now constitute the fifth-largest diaspora in the country. South Korea is currently experiencing a severe labor shortage in the midst of a demographic disaster. Uzbekistan’s large populatiom of ethnic Koreans and growing number of young people offer a practical, mutually beneficial solution to this problem. 

The United Kingdom also offers an appealing alternative as it develops a seasonal work visa system. In recent years, the UK Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs has conducted annual surveys on the conditions and satisfaction of seasonal workers, 91 percent of whom are from Central Asia. The 2024 survey showed over 90 percent of respondents reported they had a ‘positive’ or ‘extremely positive’ experience working in the UK and expressed a desire to return to the UK through the Seasonal Worker visa. Helping officials make migrants’ experiences better, the survey looks at workers' satisfaction with their pay, hours, accommodations, and supervisors. It also assesses the accessibility of the program, ensuring there are minimal hurdles to participating.  

With labor shortages all over the world, there are vast opportunities for Central Asian migrants. Training programs like Japan’s language courses in Bishkek and visa programs like the UK’s offer workers the opportunity to earn higher wages in countries that strive to improve, rather than undermine, worker conditions and accessibility. Migration policy is strengthening Central Asia’s bilateral ties with South Korea, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Japan, while Russian policies are only deepening the divide between Russia and Central Asia. If Russia’s anti-immigrant agenda escalates, Russia might no longer be a viable destination for Central Asian migrants in the near future. As the possibility of mass deportation looms after the September 10 deadline, Central Asia has the opportunity to lean on these growing relationships and make a final push away from dependence on the Russian labor market.