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iskp’s resurgence: the growing threat to central asia and global security

ISKP’s Resurgence: The Growing Threat to Central Asia and Global Security

Author: Samantha Fanger

07/19/2024

Image source: Wiki commons

The Islamic State in the Khorasan Province (ISKP) has intensified its recruitment efforts across Central Asia over the last several years.  The escalation of ISKP's activities has raised global alarms.  Despite the Taliban's efforts to suppress ISKP within Afghanistan, the group has expanded its operations to Central Asia, and beyond, and now appears increasingly poised to carry out transnational attacks.  

A United Nations (UN) report from 2023 estimates that, including member citizens in Central Asia, ISKP fighters and their family's number between 4,000 and 6,000.  This figure has long been a significant concern for regional leaders and security authorities.  Notable incidents include the 2018 vehicle attack on foreign cyclists in Tajikistan's Danghara district and a 2019 gunfight involving Tajik security forces along the Tajik-Uzbek border, as well as incidents of prison violence in Khujand in 2018 and east of Dushanbe in 2019.  Recent years have also seen ISKP militants launching rocket attacks into Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.  

The increases in counterterrorism-related detentions in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan this year are a testament to the persistent nature of this problem.  While enhancing counterterrorism efforts is crucial, the region and its partners must be vigilant not to underestimate the seriousness of the threat and the essential security measures needed to address it, at the same time ensuring that these measures are not misused to suppress dissent under the pretext of combating terrorism. 

The West was aware of ISKP's presence in the region and global ambitions but believed the group lacked the capability to achieve them—until now.  ISKP has persisted in advancing its agenda to expand globally and will likely continue to do so unless there is enhanced international cooperation on counterterrorism. 

The group’s March attack on Crocus City Hall in Moscow, which killed over 140 people, is one of the most recent examples of the danger ISKP poses and its potential to compromise the security and stability of nations worldwide.  Since then, at least eight Tajik nationals with ties to ISKP have been caught at U.S. border crossings, and the group has threatened the European Cup in Germany and the Olympic Games in France.  In June, Kyrgyzstan’s State Committee for National Security detained 15 people connected to ISKP in the capital, Bishkek, and in other regions of the country.   

A growing pattern of ISKP-related schemes has unfolded in the past several years.  For example, a Tajik Islamic State cell's alleged plan to target U.S. and NATO military bases in Germany, thwarted by German police in April 2020, underscores the counterterrorism challenges posed by the radicalization of a small segment of Central Asian migrants in Europe.  In December 2023, three others were apprehended in Austria on suspicion of involvement in an "Islamist network," even as Vienna and Cologne increased police controls due to heightened security concerns during the Christmas season.  The detained individuals, reportedly Tajiks, were allegedly plotting attacks on behalf of ISKP. 

ISKP Recruitment in Central Asia 

ISKP emerged in 2014, composed of defectors from factions like al-Qaeda and former Taliban fighters from Afghanistan and Pakistan. The central Islamic State formally extended its presence to the Khorasan region in 2015.  Despite its name suggesting a regional focus on Khorasan, ISKP follows the broader ISIS ideology that aims to establish a transnational caliphate.  

Starting in late 2021, ISKP began translating its publications from Pashto and Farsi into Tajik and Uzbek languages through channels linked to the Al-Azaim Foundation. This initiative led to the emergence of Tajik- and Uzbek-language media channels on platforms like Telegram, previously dominated by Farsi content.  By mid-2021, the Tajik-language Sadoi Khuroson channel appeared, sharing original audios, followed by numerous other Central Asian language media outlets online, indicating strong connectivity.  ISKP's Uzbek branch also developed media platforms under the Al-Azaim Foundation, eventually merging with the Tajik branch to support local publications.  In 2022, ISKP's main media outlet expanded its content to include Tajik and Uzbek translations, along with original propaganda aimed specifically at Central Asian audiences.   

Regionally, ISKP has proven to be a destabilizing force and a direct threat to countries like Tajikistan and Uzbekistan through attacks and cross-border activities. Its extensive presence on social media has the potential to incite lone-wolf attacks globally, and its coordinated plots have targeted nations far from its original operational hub.  As ISKP's influence and operational capabilities grow, the heighted global security threat it poses necessitates greater international attention and cooperation. 

Paths Forward 

While Washington has shifted its focus away from a counterterrorism-centric security approach since 9/11, there remains a risk of resurgent threats if strategies to combat rising terrorism are not upheld.  Amid the uptick in extremist activity, the Biden administration is considering greater cooperation with the Taliban to monitor and mitigate ISKP’s presence in the region.  However, deep-seated distrust lingers between the West and Afghanistan after years of conflict and the Taliban's resurgence following the withdrawal of American troops in August 2021.  The Taliban's ongoing human rights abuses and strict governance pose significant ideological obstacles to regional counterterrorism collaboration efforts. 

After the Taliban take-over of Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan did not allow Afghan citizens to enter their territories, exempting only a few high-level delegations, and have been resistant to taking in refugees for fear of radicalization within their own borders.  However, Central Asia's relationship with the Taliban has evolved into a cooperation based on shared norms.  

Central Asian countries have been more open to engaging in bilateral trade with Afghanistan across sectors such as food, petrochemicals, and construction over the last two years.  Additionally, countries like Kazakhstan have provided humanitarian aid, including essential supplies such as food and medicine, to assist Afghanistan during periods of economic and humanitarian hardship.   

Central Asia is cautiously navigating its strategic engagement as Afghanistan's neighbor, while still refraining from officially recognizing the Taliban as the legal governing power of Afghanistan. Although the United States maintains some open channels with the Taliban for counterterrorism efforts, Washington continues to debate whether to normalize relations further with a regime that harbors extremist factions.  Amidst this complex geopolitical landscape, the United States has already reconstituted security programs in Central Asia and elsewhere that can serve as the foundation of this sort of cooperation, such as the Virginia National Guard joint training program with Tajikistan and similar programs across the region, specifically in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.   

State Partnership Programs focus on areas such as advanced infantry tactics and counterterrorism to enhance bilateral military cooperation and readiness.  Expanding these programs and increasing security cooperation will be essential, as Central Asia could play a greater crucial role as security partner with the West.  During any future period of critical cooperation on security issues, common training, as well as close cooperation and partnership, will be important for counterterrorism effectiveness, particularly as efforts intensify to counter the expanding threat of ISKP in the region and globally. 


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