Two events have underscored the significance of Georgia’s strategic Black Sea coast in recent months.  First was an announcement by Georgian officials in May that China would be engaged in the next attempt to construct a commercial port at Anaklia.  Next was the first recorded appearance of a Russian naval vessel at the Ochamchire port in July.  Both demonstrate the geostrategic importance of the coast, as well as new engagements by China and Russia in this unique corner of the Black Sea.  This activity takes place at what appears to be a significant breaking point in Georgia’s relations with the West, as both the European Union (EU) and United States are reevaluating their relationship to Tbilisi.  

The construction of a commercial port at Anaklia is a long-running goal for Georgia to expand its Black Sea trade capabilities, surviving transfers of power between successive administrations.  The port would form a crucial link in the Middle Corridor transit route, allowing goods and resources to transit from China, through Central Asia and the South Caucasus, and onward to Türkiye  and Europe.  Currently, Georgia’s only Black Sea port is located at the city of Batumi, and experts warn that Georgia’s current infrastructure is insufficient to take advantage of the new and greatly expanded interest in trans-Caspian commerce.  The port at Anaklia is a strategic goal for Georgia, regardless of which party is currently in government.  

The most recent rounds of bidding on the project by outside firms also took on a geopolitical dimension.  After U.S.-based Conti International pulled out from its involvement in 2022, two firms were in the running to construct the port – a  Swiss-Luxembourgian company and a consortium of two Chinese state-owned construction companies.  On May 29, Georgian officials announced that the Chinese bid had secured the Anaklia project, with the additional surprise announcement that the China Road and Bridge Corporation and Qingdao Port International Co Ltd would act as subcontractors on the port.  The move stirred concern among some European officials that China is rapidly developing political and economic ties with Georgia and now appears set to become an active player on Georgia’s Black Sea coast. 

Paralleling this development only two months later, Russia took another step forward in establishing a naval presence of its own on this coastline.  Since October, Russia has been in the process of constructing a military port at Ochamchire, within separatist controlled Abkhazia, though actual construction of a port is likely to take another two or three years.  However, a Russian naval ship was for the first time spotted via satellite imagery at Ochamchire in early July shortly after a successful Ukrainian drone-boat attack on the Russian Novorossiysk Black Sea port.  The early use of the port may signal that the Russians intend to utilize Ochamchire sooner than expected, especially if Ukrainian forces continue to successfully strike Novorossiysk.   

This period has also seen a pivotal turning point in Georgia’s relations with the West.  Relations have declined between Tbilisi, Brussels, and Washington over several years, particularly with respect to Georgia’s increasing ties to Russia.  But it now appears that the passage of a controversial Russian-style foreign agents law in May, despite mass street protests in opposition, was a red line for Brussels and Washington.  Since the passage of the law restricting foreign assistance funding, the EU has stated that Georgia’s long-running accession process is on “de facto halt” and has ended EU financial assistance to the Georgian military.  In response to passage of the foreign agents law, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced the U.S. approach to Georgia was also under full review.  In late May, the United States placed visa restrictions on a handful of top Georgian officials involved with the foreign agents law and in July, citing “the Georgian government's false accusations against the United States and other western entities,” and suspended annual U.S.-Georgian military exercises. 

The West is not necessarily ending its engagement with Georgia.  The EU announcement that halted military support made sure to note that the funds would be re-purposed towards supporting Georgian civil society.  U.S. statements make clear that policy on Georgia’s territorial integrity have not changed and underline long-term support for Georgia’s democracy.  With elections coming up this October, if there is a change in government, relations between Tbilisi and the Trans-Atlantic block could return to what has been the decades-long norm of close cooperation.  With unusually strong pro-Western attitudes among the population, it may be that Georgia’s current course is temporary.  If, however, the governing Georgian Dream party retains power, it could likely spell a deterioration in relations between Tbilisi and the West for at least a few years to come. 

Georgia’s geopolitical stance is in flux.  Long a staunch ally of the trans-Atlantic block, the last year has seen a major shift for Tbilisi.  At the same time, Georgia’s strategic location and value is being underlined by Russian and Chinese actions.  NATO might have turned the Baltic Sea largely into a “NATO-lake” with the inclusion of Finland and Sweden, but the same cannot be said for the Black Sea, where Moscow and Beijing are making significant investments.  Georgia would appear to be a key player in this apparent realignment.