Welcome to Central Asia in Focus, a newsletter offering insight and analysis on events shaping the region’s political future. I’m Bruce Pannier. In this week’s edition: Uzbekistan’s Senate adopted the its “undesirable foreigners” law, the role of “Russian Community” Nationalists’ role in raids on migrant communities grows, and more.

In the Region

Uzbek Senate Adopts “Undesirable Foreigner” Law

Uzbekistan’s Senate adopted the so-called “undesirable foreigners” law at a session on September 20.

The law imposes a five-year entry ban on foreigners “who make public statements or engage in actions that insult the honor, dignity, or history of Uzbekistan and its people…”

The amendment to the law, which still needs the president’s signature, does not mention any specific foreigners.

However, it comes after comments at a December 2023 Moscow press conference from Russian writer and politician Zakhar Prilepin, who said Russia should annex Uzbekistan.

In January 2024, Mikhail Smolin, identified as a Russian historian, claimed on Russian television channel NTV that the Uzbek people did not exist before the Bolshevik Revolution.

Rights group Article 19 released a statement on July 8, signed by 25 international rights organizations that called on Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoev to veto the proposed law.

The statement said the amendments “represent a flagrant violation of international standards on freedom of expression and pose a serious risk of isolating the country.”

The Oliy Majlis, the lower house of parliament, will draw up a list of foreign citizens and stateless persons who should be barred from entering Uzbekistan.

Such people are also prohibited from opening bank accounts, purchasing real estate, participating in the privatization of state property, and engaging in financial and contractual relations in Uzbekistan.

Why It’s Important: Uzbek authorities undoubtedly will decide what constitutes an insult to the honor, dignity, or history of Uzbekistan and its people.

This means any foreigners, including international rights activists and journalists, who criticize something in Uzbekistan risk being declared undesirable.

It remains to be seen how and against whom this law is used, but it might give some people reason to reflect carefully on what they say about Uzbekistan.

Criticisms of government social policies, defending the rights of the LGBTQ community, for example, questioning the state’s version of tragedies or violence, could be ruled an “insult” and used to bar a person from entering Uzbekistan for up to five years.

Conversely, if a high-ranking Russian official makes what could be considered a derogatory remark about Uzbekistan or its people, will Uzbek authorities put them on the undesirable list? 

“Russian Community” Nationalists’ Role in Raids on Migrants Grows

A group calling itself Russkaya Obshchina (Russian Community) is increasingly visible during police raids on migrant workers in Russia.

Several Tajik citizens caught up in a raid in the city of Naro-Fominsk, 45 miles southwest of Moscow, spoke under condition of anonymity with RFE/RL’s Migrant Media project.

They said Russian police, members of Rosgvardia (National Guard), and Russkaya Obshchina nationalists arrived at the Detsky Mir (Children’s World) warehouse in Naro-Fominsk where many migrant laborers work.

Hundreds of migrant laborers were taken to an area outside the warehouse. 

One Tajik caught in the raid said they were “kept from morning to evening… [and] forced to stand motionless, with their hands on the shoulders of those in front, or to sit in one place…”

“[The police and nationalists] said stand up, sit down, stand up, sit down. And all these [workers] had documents,” according to the Tajik worker.

BBC called Russkaya Obshchina the “largest far-right organization [in Russia].”

RFE/RL’s Current Time TV reported members of Russkaya Obshchina are increasingly joining Russian law enforcement personnel in raids on migrant laborers.

Russkaya Obshchina nationalists accompanied police in a raid on migrant laborers in Yekaterinburg in early August.

After police detained nine migrants selling fruits and vegetables, members of Russkaya Obshchina told passers-by they could take anything from those migrants’ produce stands.

Why It’s Important: Xenophobia in Russia that targets Central Asians has been on the rise since the March 22 attack on Moscow’s Crocus City Hall that killed more than 140 people and Russian authorities blamed on Tajik nationals.

Central Asian migrant laborers in Russia have had to contend with abuse from nationalists and skinheads for years, but these groups did not accompany police on raids.

Russkaya Obshchina represents a new level of racism in Russia – thugs with the open backing of Russian law enforcement agencies. 

Majlis Podcast

The latest Majlis podcast looks at Russia’s recent push to maintain its influence in Central Asia.

After Russia launched its full-scale war in Ukraine, many countries rushed to sign agreements with the Central Asian states while the Kremlin’s attention was fixed on Ukraine.

A big part of Russia’s response has been to fill Central Asia’s energy needs, potentially binding some of the Central Asian countries to Russia for decades to come.

The guests on this podcast are:

• Assel Tutumlu, a lecturer at the International Relations and Political Science Department at the Near East University in Cyprus;
• Francis Olmos, a senior researcher in Central Asian affairs at Spain’s GEOPOL 21 Center and research fellow at the London-based Foreign Policy Center; and
• Temur Umarov, a fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin. 

What I’m Following

Central Asia Barometer to Suspend Operations

The Central Asia Barometer (CAB) announced a temporary suspension of operations “due to the growing insecurity and challenges in conducting ethical survey research in the region…”

CAB director Kasiet Ysmanova made the announcement in a September 16 message that said pressure on the organization had “significantly impacted our ability to continue our work.”

CAB has been a leader in conducting polls of the Central Asian population on a wide range of issues.

CAB’s surveys include the Central Asian public’s perception of the Russia-Ukraine war; of relations with Turkey; which language Kazakhs speak at home; and which messaging apps are popular in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. 

New Taliban Envoy Arrives in Uzbekistan

Abdul Ghafar Tirawi has arrived in Uzbekistan and is expected to officially take up his duties as Afghanistan’s ambassador in Uzbekistan on September 29.

Gafar replaces Moghfurollah Shahob, who took up the post only in February 2024.

Shahob, an ethnic Pashtun, is the son of the Taliban’s recently dismissed acting Minister of Mining and Petroleum, Shahabuddin Delawar.

Delawar was sacked from his minister’s post in July for nepotism regarding the appointment of his son to be Afghanistan’s top diplomat in Uzbekistan.

Delawar was then transferred to the post of head of the Afghan Red Crescent Society.

New envoy Tirawi is reportedly an ethnic Uzbek. 

Fact of the Week

Uzbekistan’s State Statistics reported natural gas output for the first eight months of 2024 came to 29.93 billion cubic meters (bcm).

That puts the country on pace to produce less than 45 bcm this year, down from last year’s output of 46.7 bcm, which was the lowest figure for Uzbekistan’s gas production in the 21st century.

Just a few years ago, Uzbekistan was regularly producing more than 50 bcm annually and was a gas exporter.

Next year, Uzbekistan is expected to import 11 bcm of Russian gas. 

Thanks for Reading

Thanks for reading Central Asia in Focus! I appreciate you sharing it with other readers who may be interested.

Feel free to contact me on X, especially if you have any questions, comments, or just want to connect about topics concerning Central Asia.

Until next time,
Bruce

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